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ON EARL WARREN'S RETIREMENT: 
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR KURLAND 
Francis X. Beytagh, Jr.* 
ON that Monday in June of this year when Earl Warren removed his robe for the last time, a significant era in the history of 
the country, not just that of the Supreme Court, came to an end. It 
was in recognition of this (and somewhat in anticipation, as events 
turned out) that the Michigan Law Review published a symposium 
on the so-called "Warren Court" in its December 1968 issue.1 Those 
articles were ·written by distinguished scholars and practitioners and 
are of consistently high quality. All but one of them dealt with im-
portant substantive matters considered and decided by the Court 
during ·warren's tenure as Chief Justice. The remaining article, by 
Professor Philip B. Kurland, was more distinctly personal-and 
less than wholly laudatory-in its thrust. It is partly in response to 
that piece, and partly in simple tribute to a great public servant, 
that this Article is written.2 · 
At the outset, I must confess a considerable bias in favor of Earl 
Warren, since I served as his senior law clerk during one of the 
Court's more notable recent terms--the 1963 Term. I saw him 
work under severe stress, for that was the period in which he served 
as both Chief Justice and head of the Warren Commission investi- -
gating the assassination of President Kennedy. I came to know and 
respect him as a jurist and as a man. I learned much from him-
• Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice. B.A. 1956, University 
of Notre Dame; J.D. 1963, University of Michigan. The views expressed herein are 
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Jus-
tice.-Ed. 
1. The term "Warren Court" originated during the early days of "massive resis-
tance" to the Court's school desegregation decisions. For that reason, among others, 
the phrase was never one that curried much favor with either "Warren or those who 
respected the Court and believed in the correctness of those decisions. The term has 
achieved latter-day acceptability, however, and is no longer used, at least exclusively, 
in a derisive sense. At lea~t two recent studies of the Court, both of some renown, are 
so entitled. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT (1968); J. FRANK, THE WARREN CouRT (1964). 
2. In a unique sort of way, the University of Michigan Law School owes a special 
debt of gratitude to Chief Justice Warren. Six of its graduates have served him as 
law clerks, more than any other Justice, past or present, has taken from the school. 
This is particularly remarkable, I think, since Warren, a Californian throughout his 
entire life, had no previous contact with the school or with the State of Michigan. It 
reflects, at least in part, his deeply felt conviction that clerkships should not be the 
special preserve of a select few Eastern law schools. Warren, of course, graduated from 
the University of California Law School at Berkeley, and regularly took one of his 
law clerks from a '\Vest Coast school. 
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perhaps most by example-and will always remain indebted to him. 
But sentiment alone hardly prompts this piece, for whatever verdict 
historians finally render on the Warren Court and on Warren as a 
Chief Justice, he has undoubtedly been one of the most important 
public figures of our time. His long years of public service-over fifty 
in number-and his unflagging support of a number of worthy causes 
make him richly deserving of tribute by the legal profession and by 
the country on the occasion of his retirement. With that as a back-
ground, I turn to some of the points made by Professor Kurland.3 
I 
Professor Kurland starts with a propos1t10n with which it is 
difficult to disagree: that it is "too early to sanctify" Earl Warren.4 
Of course, it is too soon to pass definitive judgment on the merits of 
the Warren Court or of Warren as a Chief Justice. It is unfortunate, 
however, that Kurland did not follow his own advice. Instead, he 
feels that his assigned role in the symposium is that of "the devil's 
advocate," which he plays, according to precedent, by seeking to 
make out "a good case against the miracles that Warren is supposed 
to have performed, but not a good enough case to be convincing."5 
He has at least accomplished the latter objective. 
Anyone who seeks to evaluate the performance of an individual 
who has held the office of Chief Justice of the United States should 
initially be struck by the fact that there are so few men with whom 
to compare him. There have been thirty-seven Presidents and even 
more Vice-Presidents, but Earl Warren was only the fourteenth 
Chief Justice.6 In this respect the position is a unique one among 
3. See Kurland, Earl Warren, The "Warren Court," and the Warren Myths, 67 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 353 (1968). Nothing in my remarks about Kurland's article is intended 
to reflect on his scholarship or achievements. He is, of course, an established teacher 
of constitutional law, has written extensively on a variety of constitutional law sub• 
jects, and has served as editor of the valuable SUPREME COURT R.Evmw, an annual 
publication, since its inception in 1960. 
4. Kurland, supra note 3, at 353. 
5. Id. 
6. Warren was consistently aware that he served as "Chief Justice of the United 
States" and not merely as "Chief Justice of the Supreme Court" [see 28 U.S.C. § 1 
(1964)]-a proper reflection of the fact that he presided over a separate and constitu• 
tionally co-equal branch of the federal government. He was not, however, simply con· 
scious of this fact; he acted upon it through his leadership of the Judicial Conference 
and his continued insistence on the attainment of the highest standards in the federal 
judicial system, as well as through his support for the Federal Judicial Center which 
now, at long last, is in operation. See Clark, The New Federal Judicial Center, 54 
A.B.A.J. 743 (1968). 
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offices that are traceable to the beginnings of the federal system. This 
uniqueness, I suggest, has a special effect on any individual who serves 
as Chief Justice. He is distinctly one among few. Indeed, it is dis-
cernible at times that the other Justices, however cognizant they are 
of their own special roles, view the office of Chief Justice with some 
awe. 
Since evaluation by comparison is so difficult, a careful look at 
the officeholder and his accomplishments is essential. Too often, 
Professor Kurland's assessment rests either upon the positing of in-
appropriate criteria or upon an overly simple application of correct 
standards. For instance at one point, Kurland poses an inapt either-
or standard for assessing whether or not an individual has been a 
"great Chief Justice."7 He states that Warren would qualify for the 
accolade if the test were whether or not he "presided over a Court 
that has written, rewritten, and repealed large segments of the law of 
the land ... ,"8 but that he does not so qualify if "reliance is to be 
placed on Warren's individual contributions to American juris-
prudence as revealed in his opinions .... "0 I submit that however 
brilliant and articulate an individual jurist may be, he is unlikely 
to be ranked as a "great Chief Justice" if the Court over which he 
presided was othenvise a pedestrian and undistinguished one. I also 
feel, although Kurland might dispute this, that a Court is un-
likely to be significant and distinguished if the Chief Justice who 
presides over it is lacking in qualities of leadership, is ineffective as 
a judge, or is inarticulate in speaking for his Court. Because of the 
role the Chief Justice necessarily plays-although he casts only one 
vote-it would be very difficult for the eight other Justices to com-
pensate for any substantial deficiencies in their senior. 
Professor Kurland apparently feels that there is one characteristic 
which is central to any ranking of individual Justices: penetrating 
analysis of legal problems in studied and scholarly opinions. Even if 
one accepts this narrow and slanted approach, Warren does not fare 
badly, for the majority opinions which he wrote in many of the 
important cases decided during his time on the bench, from Brown 
v. Board of Education10 through Reynolds v. Sims,11 South Caro_lina 
7. Kurland, supra note 3, at 353. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
IO. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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v. Katzenbach,12 and Miranqa v. Arizona,13 to the recent Powell v. 
McCormack,14 are, viewed objectively, readable, quotable, and 
hardly lacking in persuasive force. Whatever one's view of the 
relative merits of the results reached in these cases, it can scarcely 
be maintained that Chief Justice Warren's opinions did not con-
stitute, in Kurland's words, a substantial "individual contribution 
to constitutional jurisprudence.''15 
Qualities of leadership within the institution of the Supreme 
Court are more difficult to evaluate. I do not suggest that Earl 
Warren dominated the Court on which he sat. With strong-minded 
brethren such as Justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter, one 
simply could not adhere to such a view. Nevertheless, I do not agree 
with Professor Kurland's statement that "Warren has not formed 
the Court but rather . . . the Court has formed him.''16 On the 
contrary, I think it is clear that Warren's influence "extended be-
yond the power of the one vote that is conferred upon him as a 
member of the Court.''17 
In the first place, the influence of a Chief Justice's power to as-
sign opinions is substantial, and Warren used this authority in vari-
ous ways to shape the Court's approach to difficult problems. He 
sought to bring along recalcitrant or undecided Justices by giving 
them the majority opinions; he attempted to balance the opinion-
writing load among his brethren while assigning at least several 
important opinions a term to the particular Justices who were 
interested in those cases; and he demonstrated a refined sense of 
judicial intuition by anticipating the sort of opinion a Justice might 
write before assigning a significant case to him. Citations are not 
readily available to support these propositions, but anyone who has 
followed the Warren Court closely can verify them. Moreover, the 
effect of a Chief Justice's role at conference in stating the cases to be 
discussed and voted upon by him and his brethren, while subtle, is 
considerable. Although not even the most trusted law dark or secre-
12. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
14. 37 U.S.L.W. 4549 (U.S. June 16, 1969). The Powell case-Warren's last major 
opinion-appears to be landmark in character. Like Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), it resolves a great deal about the relationship of the Court and 
another co-equal branch of the federal government while, at the same time, deciding 
very Ii ttle in the actual case. 
15. Kurland, supra note 3, at 356. 
16. Id. at 354. 
17. Id. 
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tary is allowed to invade the inner sanctum of the Court's Friday 
conferences, it is fair to assume that Warren's ability to get to the 
heart of a matter allowed him to use his authority to present cases to 
the Court in an influential way. Perhaps most important in this re-
gard, however, is the strong moral force that Warren exerted dur-
ing his years on the bench. Several of his former law clerks (or 
perhaps the same one) have been quoted to the effect that Warren 
is "a rare man, because he comes so close to representing the con-
sensus of decent opinion,"18 and that "much of his strength as Chief 
Justice lies in the fact that he reflects to a remarkable degree the 
prevailing concept of justice.''19 This combination of moral strength 
and liberal open-mindedness is an extraordinary one, and Warren's 
sense of morality-his instinct for the rightness of things--was surely 
not lost on those who sat on the bench and decided cases with him. 
There is, of course, a much broader context in ·which the Court 
-and the Justices--exercise leadership. Here again, Professor Kur-
land's perspective is too limited. I submit that he poses the wrong 
question when he seeks to measure Warren as a Chief Justice by 
whether or not he can be regarded "as the intellectual or forensic 
superior of any of his brethren.''20 Whatever the validity of Kur-
land's assessment of these terms, surely his standard is subject to 
question. Of course, the Supreme Court is not an ordinary judicial 
body. It is not only "supreme" in a jurisdictional sense, but it also 
necessarily plays an important pedagogical role in our legal system. 
Thus, qualities of sheer brilliance of intellect and consummate skill 
in the techniques of opinion ·writing are important to the Court. But 
that hardly means that these qualities are essential in all nine Justices 
or in a Chief Justice, or that they are the sine qua non of an out-
standing jurist. Despite Professor Cox's reminder that judicial "crafts-
manship" gives decisions a "force of legitimacy" that they otherwise 
would lack,21 the Court's basic function is to decide cases, and to 
decide as many of them as psosible correctly. Its exercise of that 
function is most significant when it seeks to construe and to apply 
broad constitutional commands, such as those contained in the first, 
fifth, and fourteenth amendments, to specific factual situations so 
as to reflect underlying societal aspirations and goals of justice, fair-
ness, and equality. The Warren Court sought to decide cases with 
18. NEWSWEEK, July I, 1968, at 33. 
19. J. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 253 (1967). 
20. Kurland, supra note 3, at 354. 
21. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 48 (1968). 
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this overriding consideration in mind, and Warren was at the fore-
front of that movement. He chose to take many of the most contro-
versial opinions himself-Brown, Reynolds, Miranda, and Powell22 
-because he felt that it was his obligation to do so.23 He never 
shirked the role of lightning rod for the institution over which he 
presided, a role the Court's opponents forced him to play. He gave 
no recognition to the sterile controversy over judicial activism versus 
passivism, nor did he speak out against his or the Court's critics, 
despite extreme provocation. What he did, and what the Warren 
Court generally did, was to decide the cases that came before it-
difficult and complex as many of them were-in a way that seemed 
as just as possible in the individual circumstances. If that means that 
the Chief Justice and the Court were result-oriented, as many critics 
have charged, so be it. History may well record that they were right 
in so proceeding; similar charges were levelled at the Marshall 
22. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Powell v. McCormack, 37 U.S.L.W. 
4549 (U.S. June 16, 1969). 
23. Among the "Warren myths" that Professor Kurland seeks to dispose of is 
that the Chief Justice was "a cohesive force, drawing together the disparate views 
of his brethren into a unified whole." Kurland, supra note 3, at 355. By comparing 
the Warren Court with the "Nine Old Men" who sat on the Court during the 
1930's, he concludes that the facts are to the contrary and that the Warren Court 
"has been the most divided, if not the most divisive, in American history." His use of 
statistics in this regard has superficial appeal, but figures alone often fail to tell the 
entire story. The relevant question is not the one Kurland poses, but one that does 
not admit of an answer: would the Court during the past sixteen years have been 
even more divided without Warren's leadership, in light of the nature of the issues 
it has had to resolve, the strength of character and depth of feeling of its members, 
and the tenor of the times in which it has acted? Kurland's comparison with the 
New Deal Court is thus simply unconvincing, and does not provide a sound basis for 
concluding that Warren was not a conciliating force on his Court. 
Particularly unpersuasive is his statement that "the presence of ·warren on the 
Supreme Court and that tribunal's unanimity ... [in the Brown opinion was nothing] 
more than coincidental." Id. at 356. On what is this statement based, and why is it 
"safe to say" that Justices Black and Frankfurter contributed at least as much as 
Warren to the unanimous result in Brown? To my knowledge, many factors con-
tributed to that result, but certainly important among them was the new Chief 
Justice's strong conviction that such unanimity was of great institutional importance. 
He may later have come to regret the "all deliberate speed" standard enunciated 
during the next term [Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); Calhoun 
v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1964); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 
(1963); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 530 (1963). See also Carter, The 
Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 237, 243 (1968)], but his role in 
shaping the Court's decision in Brown cannot be so readily disparaged. Perhaps the 
result was preordained and inevitable, but unanimity was not. ·warren was the Chief 
Justice in his first term when the decision was finally rendered; unanimity was ob-
tained, and it was he who wrote the opinion. Perhaps all this was coincidental, but 
that is hardly likely. In this regard, see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958), in 
which a unanimous Court reaffirmed Brown in an opinion unusual in that it was 
specifically signed by all nine Justices. 
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Court, and history has long since rendered a favorable judgment on 
that body.2' 
Finally, there is an even more fundamental point to be made. If 
one forgets for a moment Professor Kurland's criteria for measuring 
the stature of justices and concentrates instead on the essential quali-
ties that Earl Warren brought to the task of judging, it is difficult to 
conclude that he was anything less than a superb Justice. His most 
distinctive quality was a highly refined feeling for the facts which 
were critical to the decision in a given case. Central to this ability is, 
for want of a better phrase, a demonstrated instinct for the jugular-
a characteristic which many esteemed lawyers and judges lack, and 
which, more often than not, sets the great apart from the good or 
average. Moreover, Warren had the ability to personalize and human-
ize a factual situation, a capacity not frequently found among men in 
high positions, and one particularly hard to maintain and apply in 
the austere surroundings of an appellate court. He had an abiding 
concern for the human situation with all its weaknesses and peculiar-
ities, particularly for the disadvantaged and those who were dis-
criminated against. Thus, he consistently exhibited more interest in 
deciding individual cases fairly than in developing a body of legal 
doctrine that Kurland and others would apparently view as entirely 
consistent and logical. A fear of a few intellectual loose ends, however, 
has never been the hallmark of a great jurist. Warren also had a 
sensitive appreciation for the practical significance of the important 
cases before the Court, a quality that enabled him to cut through 
rhetoric and dogma and to attain a perspective which others some-
times failed to reach. 
Warren's overriding commitment to fairness was evidenced by 
his frequent questioning of counsel who sought to rely on a certain 
principle or doctrine without regard to the equities: "But is it fair 
to do it that way?" This notion of fairness is hardly foreign to our 
jurisprudence. Indeed, Warren would have been quite at home with 
the chancellors of old England. Of course, in many situations in the 
law it is better that a proposition be settled than that it be settled 
correctly. But that is not always so with respect to cases considered on 
the merits by the Supreme Court, particularly when constitutional 
issues are involved. Hasty overruling of constitutional decisions 
should, of course, be avoided as well. But in such cases, predictability 
24, If it becomes necessary to choose between style and substance, it seems obvious 
that the fair (or fairer) result should prevail. 
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of result is hardly a virtue in itself, and blind adherence to precedent, 
despite changed conditions, is of little value. Such a flexible ap-
proach may make things a bit more difficult for law professors and 
for others concerned with the practice and application of law. It is, 
however, the crux of enlightened judicial review-not ignoring 
precedent or history, but applying the words of the Constitution to 
new and different circumstances so as to reach a fair result in a 
particular case. 
II 
Professor Kurland's references to Warren's earlier career, used to 
exemplify his theme that the Court formed Warren and not vice 
versa, have several telling answers. First, he plainly overstates the 
inconsistencies between Warren's past endeavors and his actions on 
the Court. It is an exaggeration to say that Warren "engaged in and 
endorsed the very prosecutorial practices" that the Court recently 
condemned, and that he engaged in "the kind of Red-baiting that 
characterized the McCarthy era" both while he was a district attorney 
and while he was the attorney general in California.25 He did, as 
Attorney General of California, participate in the evacuation of 
Japanese-Americans from the West Coast, but only under the exigen-
cies of the circumstances and to his lasting regret.26 Also, while gov-
25. Kurland, supra note 3, at 354. Kurland's references to passages in a single 
biography, J. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA (1967), do not on 
balance appear to support his statements. There are, however, perhaps understandably 
at this early date, few biographical works on Warren. An early book, written for the 
1948 political campaign, is I. STONE, EARL WARREN, A GREAT AMERICAN STORY (1948). 
In the past several years, in addition to the "\Veaver book, two other biographical works 
have been published. L. HUSTON, PATHWAY TO JUDGMENT: A STUDY OF EARL "\V'ARREN 
(1966); L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1967). Of course, a number 
of recent works on the Court have discussed Warren's role as Chief Justice. See, e.g., 
A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT (1965); A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT 
FROM TAFT TO WARREN (1968), and the books referred to in note I, supra. See also, 
Lewis, Earl Warren, in THE WARREN COURT (R. Sayler, B. Boyer, & R. Gooding eds. 
1969). Interestingly, the Mason book contains, in its preface, a quotation from a letter 
written by District Judge Wyzanski to the author, stating: "I have thought for some 
years that Chief Justice Warren will go down in history second only to Chief Justice 
Marshall. I am not referring to Chief Justice Warren's intellect, legal acumen, style, 
or personal ascendancy, ••• but to his capacity to make the judicial power a chief 
instrument for their realization." A. MASON, supra, at xii. Judge "\Vyzanski's standards 
for measuring greatness in jurists apparently are very different from Professor Kur-
land's. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra. 
26. Warren was, in any event, only the state attorney general, and the orders were 
military in origin. And, of course, he was not alone in sanctioning such dubious prac-
tices. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court, 
in an opinion written by Justice Black, upheld an exclusion order directed against 
persons of Japanese ancestry in designated military areas on the West Coast. See also 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In a recent television interview which 
was included in a ninety-minute documentary by National Educational Television, 
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emor, he opposed the reapportionment of both houses of the Cali-
fornia legislature on a population basis, as later mandated by Reynolds 
v. Sims.21 
But in rendering such a harsh judgment of Earl Warren, Kur-
land apparently fails to recognize that men are capable of growth and 
crystallization of ideas with age and experience. Moreover, before 
his appointment to the bench, Warren had consistently been active 
in political life. In that role, he necessarily practiced the art of the 
possible. On the Court, however, with a lifetime appointment and 
freedom from the everyday concerns of practical politics and the in-
evitable compromises that it entails, Warren could at long last be his 
own man, responsible only to his oath and office, to the Constitution, 
and to his conscience. This, perhaps more than any other single 
factor, explains the apparent inconsistency between Warren the 
politician and Warren the Chief Justice. Thus, to the extent that 
Kurland is correct in stating that "Warren the Chief Justice has re-
vealed a very different set of values than did Warren the district 
attorney, Warren the state attorney general, or Warren the gov-
emor, "28 emphasis should be placed on the process of revelation and 
not on the differences. Indeed, it was logical that there would be 
significant interplay between Warren's personality and an institu-
tion with the history, tradition, and role of the Supreme Court; in 
fact, it would have been extremely unusual if the Court had had 
no effect on his views. It has left few, if any, who have come to it 
untouched. 
III 
After concluding that Warren's greatness-a matter he earlier 
said should be left to future historians--must depend solely on "the 
erroneous identification of the Chief Justice with the institution 
over which he presides," Professor Kurland proceeds to take " a quick 
look at the work of the Court" on which Warren sat.29 Rather than 
quarrel again with his implicit assertion that a jurist's stature is an 
either-or proposition30 and his contention that the error made in 
identifying the man with the Court is a pervasive one, I shall turn to 
Kurland's cursory discussion of the Warren Court's performance, 
Chief Justice Warren's son stated that his father regarded the evacuation decision as a 
mistake even at the time it was being carried out. 
27. 377 U.S. 5llll (1964). 
28. Kurland, supra note ll, at !154. 
29. Id. at !156. 
llO. See text accompanying note 7 supra. 
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assuming arguendo that "history may well measure Warren's place 
by the work of the Court on which he served."31 
Professor Kurland suggests that the acclaim for the Warren 
Court rests largely on five areas of its work.32 With the first four, 
there can be no dispute: the school desegregation cases (although I 
would prefer to define the category more broadly as racial discrim-
ination cases), the criminal procedure cases, the reapportionment 
cases, and the church-state cases. His final category-the obscenity 
cases-is somewhat narrow, for the Court's significant first amend-
ment decisions have involved more than just obscenity;38 but per-
haps that is just a quibble.34 In any event, Kurland puts the obscenity 
cases aside because "Warren was more likely to be found on the side 
of censorship than against it."35 Indeed, Warren has been less lib-
eral on the issue of obscenity than some of his brethren, but perhaps 
his views are dismissed a bit too brusquely. One of his continual 
concerns in this area has been with the impropriety of the Court's 
playing the role of super-censor. His suggestion as to how the Court 
might extricate itself from its present morass on the obscenity issue86 
may not be the best solution, 37 but it is entitled to more considera-
tion than Kurland is inclined to give it. 
Professor Kurland's substantive criticisms of the Warren Court's 
major accomplishments, while tentative and cryptic, seem rather 
31. Kurland, supra note 3, at 356. 
32. Kurland had, of course, earlier declared himself, in no uncertain terms, as 
something distinctly other than an aficionado of the Warren Court's work. See Kur-
land, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive 
Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964). 
33. E.g., the free press cases, symbolized by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964), and the free speech and assembly cases, such as Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
34. It is easy to relegate to obscurity the Court's internal security and loyalty oath 
cases, probably because the McCarthy era and the vigorous investigative activities of 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities are long over. But it is well to 
remember that in the trying times of the early Warren Court, that body (and some-
times only a minority thereof) sought to uphold the constitutional rights of those 
labelled (and often libeled) as subversives. Cases such as Watkins v. United States, 
354 U.S. 178 (1957), in which the Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion, led to 
wholly unfounded and thoroughly frivolous charges that Warren was a Communist 
or at least a Communist sympathizer. It is a sad commentary on a nation when a 
significant minority is sufficiently gullible to accept such charges, and is apparently 
incapable of understanding that the procedural rights and freedoms of association and 
expression that the Court was protecting in those cases are vitally important to a 
democratic society. 
35. Kurland, supra note 3, at 357. 
36. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-08 (1968) Uustice Harlan, 
concurring); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967). 
87. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (dissenting opinion). 
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wide of the mark in many respects.38 On the matter of reapportion-
ment, his essential point is that "to the extent that voting power has 
been shifted, it has been shifted from the rural areas and, in some 
cases, the cities, to suburbia-a politically more reactionary con-
stituency than even the farm groups."39 That is a rather startling 
comment, for it seems to assume that the Court's objective in the 
reapportionment cases was to allocate additional voting power to 
certain areas which might be expected to vote in a particular way. 
It is clear, however, that the Court's purpose was simply to ensure 
that each citizen be entitled to cast an equally effective and properly 
weighted vote in electing his representatives, without regard to 
where he lives. That theme is repeated throughout the Chief Jus-
tice's opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, and has been the hallmark of the 
Court's approach in this area.40 That the result reached in these cases 
38. Kurland's analysis of the Court's decisions in what he terms "the church-state 
cases" is limited to the comment that "[s]chool prayers and Bible-reading are unin-
hibited, despite the Court's decisions, except in those few places where a direct judicial 
mandate has been imposed or threatened." Kurland, supra note 3, at 357-58. No source 
is cited in support of this statement, although perhaps Kurland is substantially cor-
rect. In any event, the ultimate "success" of those decisions can hardly be measured 
by whether or not prayer and Bible-reading in public schools have been generally 
abolished within a few years after the decisions were rendered. Moreover, as Pro-
fessor Paul Kauper's thorough and perceptive article points out, "the church-state 
cases" decided by the Warren Court include other important decisions in addition to 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and School Dist. of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See P, Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty 
and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1968). 
ll9. Kurland, supra note 3, at 358. Kurland also notes that "the politicians rather 
than the people have controlled" much of the reapportionment that has taken place. 
Id. That may, of course, be legitimately viewed as presenting a number of potential 
problems, not the least of which is the political gerrymander. But the fact remains 
that "the politicians" have been required to operate within the equal-population 
framework that the Court has established, and the Court has not been reluctant 
to invalidate plans that, while approaching equality of population, include deviations 
that are not rationally explicable. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); 
Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 547 (1969); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Dud-
dleston v. Grills, 385 U.S. 455 (1967); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967). Moreover, 
as Dean McKay has noted, in a number of states, legislative reapportionment has been 
removed from the politicians' hands. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the 
Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 233, 235-36 (1968). In any event, as the Court indi• 
cated in Reynolds itself, "legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legis-
lative consideration and determination, and ••• judicial relief becomes appropriate 
only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional req-
uisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so." 377 
U.S. at 586. 
40. This theme was recently reiterated in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 
531 (1969), in which the Court stated that "[e]qual representation for equal numbers 
of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and diminu-
tion of access to elected representatives." See also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 
474, 478 (1968), holding the equal-population principle of Reynolds v. Sims applicable 
at the local governmental level. 
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might have political consequences scarcely means that the Court 
reached the result it did in order to achieve certain political ends. 
Moreover, the Court in Reynolds expressly noted that suburbs, and 
not cities, appeared to be the most disadvantaged areas under the 
existing malapportioned schemes, since population growth in those 
areas had been the greatest in recent years. 41 
In sum, Professor Kurland's criticism of the reapportionment 
decisions is certainly an odd one; it seems premised on the view 
that the holdings were motivated by partisan political considerations 
and did not work out quite the way the Court intended. This is 
unfair to the Court as an institution in that it questions the essential 
integrity of those decisions. If it is true that voting power has been 
shifted to "a politically more reactionary constituency"-and cer-
tainly that assumption is subject to doubt since people living in the 
burgeoning suburbs must have moved there from somewhere else-
so be it. As a matter of fact, some conservative commentators who 
initially opposed the reapportionment decisions on ideological 
grounds have come to the conclusion that those decisions may be a 
significant weapon in restoring some balance in our federal system 
through a revivification of the state legislatures. Kurland himself is 
apparently resigned to the view that state legislatures are to remain 
"relatively unimportant instruments" of government.42 While the 
jury is still out on that question, the signs are that legislatures 
elected under new apportionment plans, particularly where the 
previous schemes were grossly unfair, have been more vigorous and 
increasingly concerned with the unsolved problems of modern 
America. The simple and irrefutable fact is that the reapportion-
ment decisions have permitted each citizen to have a substantially 
equal voice in electing his representatives. That is all they were in-
tended to accomplish, and all they could properly have been in-
tended to accomplish. It will be years before we know their ultimate 
effect. 
As to the school desegregation decisions, Professor Kurland's 
complaint is that today "we have little more integration in the pub-
lic school systems than ·we did when Brown was decided in 1954."48 
While his point is factually correct, it is hardly telling. What Brown 
found unlawful was the purposeful maintenance of separate school 
systems based on race. At least that much has been terminated. In-
'41. 377 U.S. at 567, n.43. 
42. Kurland, supra note 3, at 358. 
43. Id. at 357. 
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deed, as Robert Carter laments,44 the Court never set out to compel 
integration. Moreover, the fact that more Negroes are not attending 
integrated schools is not so much the fault of the Court itself as it 
is a variety of social factors, among which housing and employment 
patterns, coupled with the neighborhood school concept, predomi-
nate. There is surely a limit on the effectiveness of the judicial 
process. It was more than ten years after Brown before Congress first 
took action in this field, and it was not until the Kennedy and John-
son administrations that the executive sought effectively to enforce 
Brown through litigation. And, of course, the Court itself has con-
tinually sought to implement and extend Brown.45 
But the over-all impact of Brown and its progeny cannot be mea-
sured simply in terms of the number of Negroes now attending inte-
grated schools. The psychological effect of Brown, in presaging the 
demise of the separate-but-equal concept in fields other than educa-
tion, has been great.46 Meaning has finally been given to the Civil 
War amendments which purported to give the Negro equality-
meaning which has permitted our black citizens a measure of pride 
and dignity. Congress has enacted implementing legislation, in-
cluding, most significantly, civil rights laws in 1964, 1965, and 1968, 
which have dealt with problems of equality in access to public 
accommodations, in voting, and in housing. 47 Progress has been too 
slow for some and too fast for others; and the societal cost has been 
substantial. But the longer the delay, the more substantial that cost, 
in human as well as in economic terms. It is no disservice to the im-
portance of education in our society to suggest that Brown's over-
riding significance was in triggering the present movement toward 
achieving racial equality in all aspects of American life.48 
Professor Kurland's terse comment about the Court's decisions 
44. Carter, supra note 23, at 241-43. 
45. E.g., Griffin v. Prince Edward County Bd. of Educ., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Bradley 
v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
46. Carter, supra note 23, at 246-48. 
47. See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), in which the Court 
gave a significant boost to fair housing advocates through its broad reading of 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) as prohibiting all discrimination, private as well as governmental, 
against Negroes in the sale or rental of property. 
48. Another significant aspect of Brown is that in that case the Court began to 
utilize the equal protection clause as an important vehicle of constitutional decision-
making. Indeed, one of the Vvarren Court's most significant achievements has been 
the discovery and elevation of that provision, once termed "the usual last resort of 
the constitutional arguments" by none other than Justice Holmes [Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)], to a point of transcendent importance in achieving equality 
in a number of aspects of American life. As Justice Douglas noted in Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966), "Notions of what constitutes equal 
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change." 
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in the field of criminal procedure borders on the scurrilous. He 
passes off more than a decade of decision-making in this difficult and 
controversial field with the remark that "[p]olice brutality seems not 
to be reduced, although a number of guilty defendants have been 
freed to attempt their escapades again."49 Surely the Court's de-
cisions in this area cannot be tested by the amount of police brutal-
ity or the level of crime in society.50 Its purpose has not been solely 
to reduce objectionable police practices (although they have been 
reduced)51 or to restrict the amount of crime (much less increase it, 
as some of the Court's detractors appear to think). Rather, the gen-
eral aim has been to ensure fair and equal justice under law to all 
persons charged with crime, whether in a federal or a state court, 
without regard to their wealth or any other irrelevant consideration. 52 
In short, the central objective has been to make the Bill of Rights 
meaningful for all citizens.53 Court decisions do not create crime 
or make criminals, and they cannot stop crime until the underlying 
social problems are attacked. Indeed, the Warren Court's most lasting 
achievement may well be that it finally civilized our criminal juris-
prudence by removing from it the vestiges of barbarism that still 
prevailed as recently as a generation ago and by stripping away some 
of the mystique that carried down through the common law from the 
Middle Ages. There is room for argument that the Court has carried 
logic too far in some of its decisions-particularly with respect to the 
fifth amendment.54 But the Court, after all, is an intensely human 
institution faced ·with difficult and awesome issues to resolve. It cer-
tainly cannot be held to standards of computer perfection in decision-
making. Even computers fail to work properly on occasion.55 
49. Kurland, supra note 3, at 358. 
50. Many of the Court's important decisions in the area of criminal procedure 
have, of course, involved the extension of provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states 
through the fourteenth amendment, and not the development of new substantive stan-
dards, 
51. PRESIDENT'S Cor.n.USSION ON LAw ENFORCEJ\!ENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF Jusr1CE, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93.94 (1967). 
52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961), are perhaps the leading exemplars of the Court's decisions in this field. Can 
Kurland properly dismiss them as lightly as he does? 
53. See Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REv. 249, 
253 (1968). 
54. On the other hand, it is evident that the Court has done some backing and 
filling in recent years in the field of criminal procedure. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U.S. 618 (1965), and the progeny of decisions holding newly fashioned rules of 
criminal procedure nonretroactive in effect: e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 
719 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); and Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 
244 (1969). 
55. If anyone is in a good position to render judgment presently on the work of 
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IV 
In concluding his article, Professor Kurland grudgingly concedes 
that the Warren Court might amount to something after all. He 
recognizes that, if the Court's work is viewed from a broader per-
spective, it may appear to have been more successful than the picture 
he previously had painted. But even in concession his tone is cyncial; 
he attributes to the Court the "spark[ing of] the Negro revolution 
that engulfs us at the moment," and disparagingly accuses it of caus-
ing "the egalitarian ethos that is becoming so dominant."56 Moreover, 
he purports to question whether the Court has enhanced or dimin-
ished the rule of law in our society. 57 His earlier patronizing refer-
ence to the Warren Court's "good intentions" is consistent with his 
refusal to give the Court the benefit of any doubts on this score. He 
is correct in saying that history "has a nasty way of measuring great-
ness in terms of success rather than in terms of goodness."58 But that 
point argues, I think, that Kurland should have heeded the admoni-
tion he provided both at the beginning and at the end of his piece 
-that it is simply too early to measure the greatness of either 
Warren or the Warren Court. Had Kurland adhered to this thesis, 
neither his nor this Article would have been written. He did not, 
however, practice the restraint which he preached. Thus, a response 
the Warren Court, Professor Archibald Cox, who, in his position as Solicitor General 
of the United States for over four years, argued numerous cases before that body, 
seems amply qualified. His recent book on the Court concludes with the following 
moving passage: 
Only history will know whether the Warren Court has struck the balance right. 
For myself, I am confident that historians will write that the trend of decisions 
during the 1950's and 1960's was in keeping with the mainstream of American 
history-a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit humane but not sentimental, 
a bit idealistic but seldom doctrinaire, and in the long run essentially pragmatic-
in short, in keeping with the true genius of our institutions. 
But my view is deeply prejudiced. One who has sat in the Supreme Court al-
most daily awaiting oral argument or the delivery of opinions acquires both 
admiration and affection for the Court and for all the justices. The problems 
with which they deal are so difficult, the number and variety of cases are so 
overwhelming, the implications are so far-reaching that one sits humbled by the 
demands upon them. That the institution of constitutional adjudication works so 
well on the whole is testimony not only to the genius of the institution but to 
the wisdom and courage of the individual justices. 
A. Cox, THE WARREN CoURT 133-34 (1968). 
56. Kurland, supra note 3, at 357. 
57. Professor Beaney provided a rather eloquent answer to this query by suggesting 
that "[i]f the role of the representative branches is to give voice to-as well as shape 
and lead-public opinion, it may well be the proper function of the Supreme Court 
to voice the best aspirations of our people, to give reality to the ideals we profess in 
our Constitution and Declaration of Independence, and to provide justice for those 
who otherwise have difficulty claiming it." Beaney, The Warren Court and the Politi-
cal Process, 67 MICH. L. REv. 343, 351 (1968). 
58. Kurland, supra note 3, at 357. 
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to his critical analysis of both Warren and the Court seemed to me to 
be appropriate.59 There is a good deal more that can be said on both 
sides of most of these matters. It has been my purpose simply to 
attempt to respond to the points advanced by Professor Kurland. 
With that accomplished, I should like, if he would, to abide history's 
judgment on the man and the Court over which he presided. 00 
59. Perhaps I have simply been too close to both of them; but perhaps Kurland 
has been a bit too far away. 
60. In the final analysis, how history regards the Warren Court may in large 
measure depend on whether the Court in future years accepts and builds upon its 
work or, instead, moves in the direction of overturning or undercutting many of its 
important decisions. From my vantage point, at least, the latter prospect seems unlikely, 
